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Governmental Regulation of Institutions
Financing Real Estate
rJ,
HEstate has concerned itself with financial institutions for two
reasons: to assure adequate credit facilities and to safeguard
invested savings. These separate interests, however, are often con-
tradictory, one aim being dynamic and, to a degree, speculative,
while the other is conservatory. From the one side government
stimulates while from the other it restrains; and out of the shifting
balance between these two ends the determination of a credit
policy is attempted.
Since this is a study of the relation of government to real estate
finance, we are interested only in the influence of government on
institutions financing real estate, and only to the extent that gov-
ernment influences the real estate financial policies of these institu-
tions. Yet nearly all financial institutions are engaged to some
extent in mortgage lending, specialization in real estate finance
being a minor feature of the financial system and of comparatively
recent importance. The coverage of the chapter must, therefore,
be broad.
GROWTH OF PRIVATE CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
A nation committed to a policy of widespread diffusion of real
property ownership might be expected early to have devised credit
institutions especially suited to meet the long-term credit require-
ments of such an objective. Actually, however, federal land policy
during the years of expansion was unaccompanied by a land credit
policy.1 The extensive needs for credit to finance land settlement
and improvement were supplied by individual lenders and by state
and private banks. These early institutions operated without co-
ordination, and with relatively little supervision, and were more
1 Except to the extent that time payments were permitted on the purchase of
public lands prior to 1820.
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often attuned to the speculative potentials of the land movement
than to the requirements of credit for productive purposes.
As early as the seventeenth century, efforts were made in
Massachusetts and in other New England colonies to organize pri-
vate banks to make loans on the security of real estate and personal
collateral; in the early years of the eighteenth century these efforts
began to bear fruit.2 In 1732 in Connecticut, and in 1740 in Massa-
chusetts, land banks were established that issued notes on the
security of real estate mortgages, but these institutions were short-
lived.3 In spite of this setback, many colonies did establish loan
offices or public land banks that issued notes on the security of farm
mortgages; and numerous private land bank schemes were devised,
some of which were put into actual operation.4 Inept or unscrupu-
l.ous management resulted in widespread failures, bringing the
whole theory of land bank finance into bad odor, a popular disfavor
which benefited Hamilton in his successful effort to defeat the for-
mation of a state land bank in New York in
Nevertheless, the idea was not abandoned. The early part of the
nineteenth century saw the development in the southern states of
property banks, which were mainly associations of borrowers sub-
scribing mortgages on land for capital stock and making loans from
funds obtained by the sale of bonds secured by mortgages and guar-
anteed by the states.6 Between 1840 and 1850 a regular farm mort-
gage banking business developed in the Middle West.7 In both
cases, however, the tendency to finance on the basis of anticipated
land values brought widespread failures.
Mortgage lending was not limited to thes.e specialized institu-
tions. Individual lenders remained the principal source of credit;
and, in spite of Hamilton's admonitions on the incompatibility of
mortgage paper with the requirements of commercial banking,
2 Andrew McFarland Davis, Provincial Banks: Land and Silver, Publication of
the Colonial Society of Massachusetts (Boston, 1900) Vol. 3, pp. 2-40; Currency and
Banking in the Province of Massachusetts Bay (New York, 1901) Part 2; and Davis
R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States (New York, 1931) p. 24.
3 Ibid., pp. 25-26; Earl S. Sparks, History and Theory of Agricultural Credit in
the United States (New York, 1932) Pp. 58-54. The brief and stormy histories of these
institutions are given in A. M. Davis, op. cit., and in his A Connecticut Land Bank
of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1898).
4E.S. Sparks, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
5 Nathan Schachner, Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1946) pp. 181-82,
6 E. S. Sparks, op. cit., pp. 6-7 and 83.
7 Ibid., p. 177.REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 59
state-charteredcommercial banks, from the beginning of the Re-
public, were heavily involved in loans on both farm and town
property.8 Even the Second Bank of the United States, particularly
through its southern and western branches, became an important
holder of mortgage paper and, as events turned out, of foreclosed
property.°
In spite of restrictions and repeated disasters, state banks con-
tinued to be important sources of mortgage credit. In their fusion
of mortgage and commercial lending, little differentiation between
the principles of short-term and long-term credit was made either
by the banks or by the laws under which they were regulated. The
mortgage was treated as an intermediate-term loan (of three to five
years) rather than a true long-term loan, as was dictated by the char-
acteristics of real estate investment.
Even in banks, mortgage and commercial credit were
blended in somewhat the same way as in state institutions. Although
the original Act 10 was designed to keep national banks out of the
mortgage lending field, there is strong evidence that in practice the
prohibition was elastic.1' In 1913, the Federal Reserve Act permitted
national banks to make loans on farm property for five years and up
to 50 percent of appraisal value (provided such loans did not, in the
aggregate, exceed 25 percent of the bank's capital and surplus or
one-third of its time deposits).12 In 1916, the first direct authoriza-
tion to make nonfarm loans was granted, but the contract term was
limited to one year and the maximum loan-to-value ratio was set at
50 percent. A further liberalization in 1927 extended the allowable
term of nonfarm mortgage loans to five years and permitted the ag-
gregate of such loans to reach 50 percent of a bank's time deposits.'3
8 Ibid., pp. 57-58 and 177. Also, George E. Barnett, State Banking in the United
States Since the Passage of the National Bank Act, Johns Hopkins Studies in Histori-
cal and Political Science, Vol. 20, Nos. 2-3 (Baltimore, 1902) p. 50.
9 E. S. Sparks, op. cit., p. 270.
10 13 Stat. 99 (1864); 12 U.S.C. 8.
11 Homer Hoyt, A Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago (Chicago, 1993)
p. 445.
1238 Stat. 251 (1915); 12 U.S.C. 22L
1339 Stat. 360 (1916); 12 U.S.C. 641. Amendments to the Banking Act enacted in
1935 (49 Stat. 684) are part of the effort to increase funds for mortgage lending in the
midst of the depression. They permitted national banks to make ten-year loans up
to 60 percent of value, provided at least 40 percent of the loan was amortized during
the period. National banks at this time were also permitted to make mortgage loans
insured by the Federal Housing Administration.60 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
These measures, in combination with the generally more liberal
provisions governing the operations of state banks, made mortgage
lending an integral part of the commercial banking structure. This
combination of function had, of course, the advantage of providing
real estate with sources of credit not otherwise available. Neverthe-
less, it had the danger of tying realty finance to the highly variable
conditions of commercial credit, thus affecting the former with the
same volatility as the latter, and of placing real estate loans and com-
mercial loans into direct competition for the same funds, a situation
likely on the whole to be unfavorable to realty.
From the middle of the nineteenth. century, life insurance com-
panies became important sources of mortgage funds. Not being
subject to sudden demands for liquidity as were commercial banks,
life insurance companies could treat the real estate loan as a long-
term, slowly liquidating investment. Furthermore, because their
investments were usually less limited geographically than those of
banks, they could to a greater degree make funds available in under-
capitalized areas and avoid the risk of being tied to the fortunes of a
single area.
These were important advantages, but they were not sufficient to
bring about a complete solution of the credit requirements of real
estate. In fact, at no time for which records are available have the
insurance companies as a group held much more than 18 percent of
the total real estate mortgage debt,'4 although in 1929 insurance
companies had approximately 40 percent of their admitted assets in
mortgage loans.'5
Mutual savings banks and cooperative banks date from an earlier
period, but theirgrowth was more limited and was confined mainly
to the Middle Atlantic and New England regions. While about 28
percent of savings bank investments were real estate loans in 1948,
as compared with approximately 7 percent for commercial banks
and about 17 percent for insurance companies,'6 their principal
14 Survey of Current Business, September 1946, Table 9, p. 17.
15 Mortgage investments of life insurance companies are from annual estimates
of the Home Loan Bank Board. At the end of 1948, the proportion of mortgage loans
to assets was 19.4 percent, after having dropped to as low a ratio as 14.5 percent in
1945. In spite of the much lower ratio of mortgages to total assets, the dollar volume
of mortgages held had actually increased since 1929 to a record level of $10.8 billion
at the end of 1948. It may be noted that if the 1929 ratio prevailed today insurance
companies would hold about half the total mortgage debt.
16 Figures for mutual savings banks and commercial banks are from the 86thREGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 61
interest, both because of the law and of managerial policy, was the
encouragement and protection of thrift rather than the financing of
real estate.
The first of our present-day institutions to be established for the
specific purpose of meeting real estate credit needs were the savings
(or building) and loan associations. From a modest, semi-philan-
thropic start in 1831, these associations have grown in importance
until, at the end of 1948, they held 31 percent of the total residential
mortgage debt on one- to four-family nonfarm houses and close to
one-fifth of the total nonfarm mortgage debt.17 During their growth,
savings and loan associations have been transformed from a very sim-
ple form of cooperative society in which nearly every shareholder
was a borrower to institutions in which saving need not be associated
with borrowing. The word"building" has generally been displaced
in their title by the word "savings," and the institutions themselves
have come more and more to resemble mutual savings institutions,
although their investments have continued to be predominantly in
home mortgages. During the latter part of the last century, many
building and loan associations operated on a national basis, both as
to sources of funds and distribution of loans. The spectacular failure
of the "nationals," however, led to closer supervision and greater
geographical limitation of activity.'8 Today, they are characteris-
tically local institutions depending mainly on local capital and lend-
ing within a restricted area.
To this group of institutions may be added the mortgage bond
houses and mortgage guarantee companies, organized under state
incorporation laws and to a minor degree subject to state regulation.
They flourished mainly during the first quarter of this century, first
as farm mortgage investment media and later as means of financing
urban income property of all types. Their bond and certificate issues
were secured either by a pool of mortgages, or, in the case of large
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 1948; for insurance companies
from the annual survey of the Home Loan Bank Board. By contrast with the current
situation, many savings banks during the 1920's and 1930's held 50 to 60 percent of
their investments in the form of real estate loans.
17 Seymour Dexter, A Treatise on Cooperative Savings an4 Loan Associations
(New York, 1889) p. 43; History of Building and Loan in the States, Morton
Bodfish, ed. (U. S. Building and Loan League, Chicago, 1931) pp. 57.58. Estimates of
savings and loan business are based on Federal Home Loan Bank and Department of
Commerce figures.
18 M. Bodfish, op. cit., Chapter 7..62 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
urban properties, by a mortgage on a single development. During
the boom years of the 1920's, the bond houses competed with the
more strictly supervised financial institutions, but failures led to a
decline in their importance as a source of farm credit and to their
disappearance as a factor in the urban mortgage market.
Up to 1916 in the farm, and to 1932 in the urban, market the
institutions described above (aside from individuals and various
classes of trusts, pension funds, and nonfinancial institutions, such
as universities and foundations) composed the sources of mortgage
funds.19 With the exception of the national banks, for which mort-
gage lending was a minor and relatively recent function, all of the
institutions operated under state charter. 'With the exception of the
building (or savings) and loan associations and the mortgage bond
houses, none of the institutions providing real estate credit was
established primarily for that purpose, nor have real estate loans
often, or for long, received their principal attention. The inciden-
tal and optional character of most institutional mortgage lending is
worthy of note because of its influence on the availability of mort-
gage funds and on subsequent efforts by government to increase the
amount of mortgage lending.
INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON INSTITUTIONAL POLICY
All of the institutions mentioned above are subject to some form of
regulation, either by state or federal government, or both. The regu-
lation exists by virtue of the power to charter financial institutions,
the provisions of institutional charters, the general laws regulating
institutional investment, and the authority granted to the supervi-
sory agencies of government. Each type of regulation gives govern-
ment important means for influencing credit policies.
Because all such regulation is a matter of state jurisdiction, ex-
cepting that of the national banks and the more recent federal insti-
tutions, there is little national uniformity. Moreover, within both
federal and state spheres of influence, there is great variety among
the laws affecting different types of institutions.
19Mentionshould also be made of such specialized institutions as the Investors
Syndicate (Minneapolis) and Allied Building Credits (St. Paul). These institutions
operate under state charter and their activity, which is national in scope, has been
concerned wit.h mortgage lending, property improvement loans, and business credits
in fields of construction and materials distribution.REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 63
The result is that we have, instead of a single mortgage credit
system, or a single governmental policy affecting institutional activ-
ity, a number of systems and policies. The governmental influence,
while pervasive, is not uniform; and its effect on the flow of credit is
mixed. Indeed, its effect on the availability of mortgage credit has
often not been its most direct concern. The primary and most evi-
dent aim of governmental supervision has been to safeguard the
funds placed in institutional hands. Like the regulations affecting
the construction of buildings, the regulation of investment activity
is the product of successive disasters, and often, either in whole or in
part, has not appeared until long after the creation of the institutions
themselves.20
CHARTERING POWER
A primary impact of the state upon the financial system comes from
its power to charter financial institutions. This power, of course, is
fundamental to the creation of large pools of credit and to the man-
ner and method through which credit is made available for realty
needs. Underchartering may result in an insufficiency of credit;
overchartering may bring the reverse. However, there is little evi-
dence that, prior to the 1930's, the chartering power was used with
any positive intent of directly influencing the flow of credit unless it
was on the theory that the greater the number of banks, the better
the credit facilities. Speaking of commercial banks, Robert F. Leon-
ard says, "For many years the belief was widely shared that any group
of men with a certain, and generally rather limited, amount of
capital had an almost undeniable right to establish a bank, and over
a long period charters were freely granted."21Theconsequence has
often been to raise the supply of loan funds when the supply was
already ample, to induce speculative development and finance, to
increase the instability of the realty market, and to complicate the
difficulty of an ultimate readjustment.
Hoyt, for instance, notes the influence of loose chartering of
banks as a factor in realty speculation and collapse in Chicago. The
20Savingsand loan associations, for instance, were an invention of the 1850's, yet
the first law requiring the examination o[ such institutions was passed in 1875, and
such laws did not become general until the 1890's. M. Bodfish, op. cit., Chapter 9.
21RobertF. Leonard, of the Commercial Banking System" in Bank.
ing Studies, i.y members of the staff of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, 1941)
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easy real estate credit extended by newly chartered banks, such as
the State Bank of Illinois in 1835, and the swarm of new banks that
appeared following the passage of the State Banking Act of 1851,
were in both cases followed by a drying up of credit with the failure
of overextended rnstjtutjons.22 A similar parallelism of chartering,
speculative credit, and collapse can be found generally in the "wild
cat" banking era of the 1830's and in subsequent occasions of boom
and disaster.
In the savings and loan area, the expansion of the twenties was
accompanied by an increase in the number of associations from
around 8,600 in 1920 to nearly 13,000 in 1927.23 In spite of the
chartering of federal savings and loan associations since 1933, the
number of all operating associations at the end of 1948 was only
6,000.24 In some of the states the percentage fluctuation was much
wider than the national total. The number of savings and loan asso-
ciations in New Jersey, for instance, increased from 939 in 1920 to
1,565 in 1930 but dropped back to 501 by the end of 1948.25 While
this is an extreme case of liberal chartering and painful readjust-
ment through liquidation or reorganization, it shows how the sta-
bility of realty credit facilities has been affected by chartering policy.
It is only recently that the chartering power appears to have been
used with credit requirements clearly in view. "The convenience
and needs of the community to be served" are now important con-
siderations in chartering national banks and federal savings and
loan associations, and state authorities have adopted the same atti-
tude. Current policy has been stated as follows: "Out of the harsh
experiences of the banking troubles leading up to the bank holiday
of 1933...hascome the realization that charters should be
granted much less freely....Asa result of the cooperation of the
various Federal and State agencies, it can be said that it is the general
aim of all to grant charters only where there is demonstrable need for
the bank and reasonable assurance of its success." 26
On the whole, this statement reflects a restrictive policy result-
22 H. Hoyt, op. cit., pp. 27, 59-60, and 445.
23 M. Bodfish, op. cit., p. 131.
24 Home Loan Bank Board, Trends in the Savings and Loan Field, April 1948,
p.7.
25AnnualReports of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance of New Jersey.
Figure for 1948 is from the Home Loan Bank Board, Trends in the Savings and
Loan Field, April 1948.
26R, F. Leonard, op. cit., p. 198.REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 65
ing from the conclusion that past chartering had been in excess of
need. That the chartering power may be used to stimulate the creat-
ing of new facilities where the credit supply is considered inadequate
is evident in the chartering of national farm loan associations and
federal savings and loan associations.27
REGULATION OF THE REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO
Although details of institutional regulation as regards different
types of institutions vary between state and federal governments and
also among state governments, there is nevertheless an underlying
similarity in the concepts and methods used. The pattern of invest-
ment is established generally by law rather than through examina-
tion and supervision, and it falls into the following elements:
(1) Determination of the character of the investment: creditor
versus owner interest. The preponderant influence of the law has
been to favor institutional investments in real estate loans rather
than in equities. Prior to World War I, all types of financial institu-
tions were prohibited from owning property except that necessary
for the conduct of their business or that taken through foreclosure.
Disposition of the latter was required to be made within a few years
after acquisition. For the bulk of institutional operations, therefore,
real estate finance has meant mortgage loans.
The first important break in this legal tradition came in New
York in 1922, when insurance companies were permitted to make
direct investments in housing property. Through 1948, twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia had made it possible by special
statute for their domestic insurance companies to make investments
in residential property; companies domiciled in seven additional
states have the same power under more general statutes. Beginning
about 1945, the movement to permit equity investment was broad-
ened so as to permit investment in other types of income-producing
realty. Because of the absence of specific prohibition, such invest-
ment was already possible in five states; five others• (including the
District of Columbia) did not apply their prohibitions to the invest-
ments of companies domiciled in other states. The years 1945-47
saw a majority of the states dropping or modifying their old restric-
tions, and by the middle of 1948, thirty-four states and the District
27 See Chapter 6.66 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
of Columbia had in one way or another made investment in a wide
range of residential, commercial, and industrial real estate pos-
sible for both domestic and out-of-state insurance companies.28
Generally, the grant of authority in this new field has been broad,
with relatively few limitations on the investor. A few states have
confined realty investment to cases where long-term leases to busi-
ness establishments were involved; in some, residential investment
is limited to housing built by the investor; but the most common
limitations merely define the maximum amount of a single invest-
ment, or the aggregate of investments, or the ratio of realty invest-
ments to total assets. As might be expected, there are wide variations
among the statutes in these details. Moreover, where realty invest-
ment is given some special privilege in connection with urban rede-
velopment, such as limitation of taxes, the right to benefit from the
power of eminent domain, or a subsidy to reduce land cost, there
are often restrictions on rentals, net income, or freedom of tenant
selection.29
Starting in the main from the social purpose viewpoint (the first
New York law was closely linked with the housing shortage follow-
ing World War I), the application of the ownership-investment
principle has been broadened to that of a general outlet for funds. In
this respect, the trend is contrary to what we commonly find, par-
ticularly in the federal sphere. It constitutes the one major relaxa-
tion in favor of a freer flow of investment along lines dictated by
management rather than by government. The movement, however,
is yet too new to have resulted in any large amount of institutional
investment or any strong influence on the real estate market.3° It has
been, for the most part, limited to life insurance companies, al-
though Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York allow mutual
savings banks to invest in housing either in redevelopment projects
or otherwise. A few other states also permit savings and loan associa-
28 Summary based on a digest of state insurance laws published January 1, 1948,
by the Division of Law, Office of the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance
Agency, and supplements thereto.
29 See, for instance, New York General Laws, c. 892 (1941), c. 892 (1942), c. 234
(1943); Massachusetts Laws, c. 654 (1945).
30 As of June 30, 1949. the total amount of investment by life insurance com-
panies in the ownership of rental housing was reported by the Institute of Life In-
surance to be $275 million, with $185 million additional in projects still under
construction. Life insurance investment in commercial and industrial rental property
at the same date came to $453 million.REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 67
tions to have real estate investments of the same types; several states
permit these associations to build houses, either for their sharehold-
ers or for sale.3'
There has, however, been little activity under these last-men-
tioned authorizations. Thus, notwithstanding the opening of new
avenues, the mortgage loan remains the predominant type of realty
investment for institutional funds. The reason for this no doubt lies
in the supposed margin of safety created by the overage of value in
relation to the loan and in the covenant binding the borrower for
any deficiency. The recent interest in ownership investment has
been influenced by increasing doubts about the protection for the
institution inherent in a lender-borrower relationship, by a surplus
of funds seeking investment, and by the relatively low prevailing
mortgage interest rate.,
(2)Restrictions on the type of Property on which real estate
investments may be made. As in ownership investment, the kinds of
property in which an institution may invest on a mortgage basis are
frequently specified by law or regulation. Savings and loan associa-
tions are quite generally limited to loans on one- to four-family
houses or very small apartment buildings; farm loans are frequently
prohibited and loans on commercial and industrial realty are almost
always prohibited or narrowly limited. The authority to lend even
on residential property designed for more than four families is
usually much restricted, commonly by limiting the maximum size
of loans in which the bulk of the assets might be invested.
restrictions, of course, reflect an attempt through legislation to pre-
serve the original purpose for which this class of institutions was
created. It may be noted that in recent legislation, and proposals for
legislation, the tendency is to increase the classifications in which
mortgage loans may be made.
In contrast to the close limitations placed upon savings and loan
associations, life insurance companies may usually lend upon the
security of real estate without restriction as to type of property.
Banks, similarly, have very broad discretion in selection, although
in both instances loans on unimproved property are sometimes pro-
hibited or restricted.
31Summarybased on a digest of state insurance laws published January 1, 1948,
by the Division of Law, Office of the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance
Agency, and supplements thereto.68 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
(3)Restriction on the location of the property. State banks and
savings and loan associations are commonly restricted as to the
geographical area in which mortgage loans may be made.32 The area
may be coextensive with the state in which the institution is char-
tered or it may be limited by the area within a specified radius (often
fifty miles) from the location of the institution. Rarely may these
classes of institutions lend on property located in states other than
the one in which they are domiciled.
The reason for these limitations is threefold. First, it is assumed
that loans may be placed more safely in areas with which manage-
ment may be personally familiar. Second, it is considered desirable
to retain local funds to meet local needs. Third, it is often advan-
tageous to retain local markets for local funds. The objection raised
in 1934 by the savings and loan associations to the creation of na-
tional mortgage associations, which might operate without restric-
tion as to area, is evidence of the dislike of external competition.
Among state-chartered institutions, the life insurance compa-
nies alone have generally been permitted to invest beyond state
boundaries, and, under certain conditions, beyond national bound-
aries. Only a small proportion,. if any, of the total mortgage invest-
ment made by these institutions is restricted to the state of domicile.
Otherwise, the common area-limitation is that requiring the com-
pany to conduct an insuring business in the states, territories, or
countries in which loans are placed. The fact that insurance is sold
without geographical limitation makes such widespread activity
inevitable. In fact, to prevent insurance funds from being drained
from one locality to serve credit demands in another, Texas, as an
example, imposes regulations requiring out-of-state companies to
maintain local investments in proportion to the insurance written
within the state.
Mutual savings banks in northeastern states have generally been
allowed to make mortgage loans on properties in adjacent states. In
1949, New York and Massachusetts authorized their mutual savings
banks to make or purchase mortgage loans in any part of the United
States, if insured by the Federal Housing Administration.33
32 National banks have no area restriction; federally-chartered savings and loan
associations and farm lending institutions, however, follow state practice in restricting
the area of activity.
33 New York Banking Law, § 235, subd. 20, as amended by the L. of 1943, c. 629,
as amended by the L. of 1949, c. 545; Massachusetts General Laws (Ter. ed. 1932)REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS
The other class of national. lenders were the predepression mort-
gage bond houses and mortgage guarantee companies. These insti-
tutions placed loans and sold their securities without regard to state
lines. Loosely regulated by law, free from supervision as to their
practices, inadequately protected by reserves, and often irrespon-
sibly conducted, they fell victim both to subsequent legal restraint
and loss of public confidence. At the present time, federal restric-
tions on the interstate distribution of securities are so rigid that the
real estate bond, as formerly known, rarely qualifies for widely dis-
persed investment.
Where ownership investment is permitted for insurance com-
panies, there is sometimes a location restriction based on the size of
the city or metropolitan area in which the investment is made.
Where other institutions are permitted to indulge in ownership, lo-
cation is restricted to the state of domicile.
(4)Limitation of the proportion of assets available for realty
investment. The mortgage loans of national banks are limited to an
amount equal to their capital and surplus, or 60 percent of time and
savings deposits, whichever is greater. The mortgage loans of state
commercial banks are frequently subject to similar, though often
less restrictive, limitations.
The amount that mutual savings banks and insurance compa-
nies may invest in real estate mortgages is generally limited in rela-
tion to their total assets, but the allowance (often 60 percent or
more)is more generous than in the case of commercial banks.
Savings and loan associations are the only institutions that are re-
quired—in contrast to being permitted—to lend on mortgage secu-
rity. With the others, alternative investments may be listed at length
and, as a group, are frequently given preference over mortgage
loans; with the savings and loan associations, it is the alternative
investments that are restricted in relation to total investment.
Where ownership investment is permitted to institutions, an
investment-to-asset ratio is again stipulated, which in itself would
prevent any degree of dominance of this type of investment. A 10
c. 168, § 54a, as amended by the Act of June 2, 1949. Both of these laws extend the
authorization to cover secondary mortgages guaranteed by the Veterans' Administra-
tion and made in connection with FLIA first mortgages, according to the provisions
of § 505a of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act as amended (see Chapter 7).70 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
percent ratio on residential investments andalimitation of 3 to 5
percent on investments in other types of property are common.
(5)Regulations of the loan pattern. One of the most common
restrictions on institutional lending is the loan-to-value ratio. The
limitation is strictest for national banks, where it is held to 50 per.
cent on unamortized loans and 60 percent on loans at least 40
percent amortized within the maximum ten-year term. For state
commercial banks the limit is frequently 50 percent or somewhat
higher, but in twenty-four states no maximum loan-to-value ratio is
prescribed by law. For insurance companies the two-thirds ratio is
the norm, although the range is from 40 percent in Texas to a 75
percent ratio (where accompanied by special reserves) allowed for
insurance companies domiciled in New Jersey. With savings and
loan associations, the usual two-thirds limit is now rising to 75 per-
cent of value to conform to the loan-to-value ratio on home loans
permitted to federal savings and loan associations. Eighteen states
prescribe no legal ratio for savings and loan associations, although
in many cases these are not the same states that give a similar dis-
cretion to banks. Frequentl.y, lower ratios are set for loans on unim-
proved than on improved property, and higher ratios for amortized
than for unamortized loans.
Also, the term of the loan is often subject to regulation. National
banks are limited to mortgage loans of five years or less where un-
amortized. In many of the states, however, fully or partially amor-
tized loans may run from ten to twenty years and in thirty states no
restriction of any kind is imposed on the term of the loan. Insur-
ance companies are nOt usually restricted as to length of term, and
savings and loan associations, when restricted at all, are ordinarily
permitted terms up to twenty or twenty-five years, usually with the
requirement that loans be regularly and fully amortized. The
amount of a single loan is sometimes regulated.34
34Summarystatements in sections (1) to (5) are based upon a study, Legal Max 1-
mum for Loan-Value Ratio and for Term of Real Estate Loans by State Banks
Generally and to G.i.'s, prepared by the legal department of the American Bankers
Association, July 5, and a summary of State Laws Regulating the investment of
Mortgage Funds, prepared by the Mortgage Bankers Association, May 25, 1945. The
description does not cover mortgage loans made by federally-chartered institutions,
or insured by the Federal Housing Administrator, or those guaranteed by the Ad.
ministralor of Veterans' Affairs, for which see Chapters 6 and 7.REGULATION OF INSTITUTIONS 71
REGULATION OF METHODS OF OPERATION
In connection with the regulatory legislation, supervisory author-
ities (departments or Commissions) are commonly established for
the examination and supervision of banks, insurance companies,
and savings and loan associations. All types of state banks are super-
vised by the same state agency; savings and loan associations may
be grouped with the banks or treated separately; insurance com-
panies are almost always supervised by a separate agency.
The scope and effectiveness of the examining powers vary from
state to state, but the substance is fairly uniform. The Pennsylvania
banking law may be taken as an example.35 This law gives the bank-
ing department full power to inquire, during the course of its
examinations, into the following:
(I) Property, assets, and reserves held or maintained by the institu-
tion,
(2) Loans and collateral deposited,
(3) Methods followed by the institution in the conduct of its affairs,
(4) Investment of its funds,
(5) Interest taken in its affairs by the officers, directors, and em-
ployees,
(6) Compliance with the law and its charter,
(7) Any other matter bearing on its condition which the department
shall prescribe.
Examinations are made regularly, usually at intervals of one
year, but special reports may be demanded whenever in the opinion
of the examining authorities they may be called for to protect de-
positors, shareholders, or policyholders.
Depending upon the wording of the statute and the policy of
the administrative officials, supervision may be limited to findings
of fact: Is the business being conducted in accordance with the
limitations of the law and of the charter of the institution? Are
the records in order? Is the institution solvent? Under such a view,
action may be taken only when the examination clearly reveals
insolvency or a violation of law.
35PennsylvaniaBanking Code,401, For the summaries of this legis-
the author is indebted to Ralph H. Richards, President, Home Loan Bank of
Pittsburgh. Nature and Future of Public Supervision. Address before the Sixth Inter.
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But this narrow view of the function of supervision is probably
not widely held. On the basis of a decision of a federal court, the
state may regulate "its corporate creatures" in almost any matter
in which it sees fit. Again, the Pennsylvania law may be cited to
show the extensiveness of the power of the supervisory authori-
ties.3° Under the banking code of that state, the banking depart-
ment may take possession of the business and property of any
institutions under its jurisdiction whenever it is found that the
institution has:
(1) Violated its articles of incorporation, any order or writ issued
upon application of the department, or any law of the Common-
wealth regulating its business;
(2) Fallen into unsafe hands or is in unsound condition to transact
its business;
(3) Impaired its capital below the minimum required by law or by
its articles of incorporation;
(4) Suspended payment of its obligations and has not for a period of
one year, after due demand or notice by its shareholders, paid
any matured share or withdrawal;
(5) Refused to submit its records and affairs to, or its officers or
directors have refused to be examined concerning its affairs by,
the Secretary or examiner;
(6) Requested the department to take possession for the benefit of
depositors, other creditors, and shareholders.
In many jurisdictions, supervisors, by regulation or practice, go
beyond the requirements of law in prescribing limitations on man-
agerial discretion. Thus in Delaware, where no legislative limit is
placed on the loan-to-value ratio, the authorities frown on un-
amortized loans of more than 60 percent of value. The New Jersey
law does not restrict the volume of mortgage loans to a proportion
of time deposits or capital, but this is done by the regulations of
the banking
Supervisory agencies frequently consider it within their author-
ity to criticize or make recommendations in respect to lending
plans, appraisal practices, or other matters relating to the operation
of the institutions. After the financial collapse of the early 1930's,
36Hacklerv. Farm and Home Savings and Loan Association (1934). 6 Federal
Supplement, 610. Pennsylvania Banking Code, § 504. See R. H. Richards, cit.
37StateLaws Regulating the Investment of Mortgage Funds, Mortgage Bankers
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supervisorstended to broaden the scope of their functions, exerting
pressure on management in respect to lending policy and the liqui-
dation of foreclosed property, thus making themselves a direct
influence on the real estate market.38 This influence was greatly
amplified through the control directly exerted by the supervisory
agencies over insolvent or frozen institutions.
EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL REGULATION
The primary purpose of the legal regulation of financial institu-
tions is to maintain a watch over their solvency in the interests of
those whose funds are entrusted to them. Regulation has a pro-
found influence on the flow of funds, but in a positive sense the
influence may be greater on their flow into the institutions than it
is on their subsequent investment. Governmental supervision, com-
bined with additional protective measures to be. discussed later,
has contributed much to the confidence of the public in financial
institutions, but the influence of supervisory authorities on the flow
of funds into the realty market has tended largely to be restrictive
rather than stimulative. By increasing the conservatism of lending
policies, it has increased the demand for special means for expand-
ing the volume of mortgage credit.
Because the bulk of institutional funds that are available for
real estate finance are subject to stringent geographical limitations,
real estate finance has retained a strong local flavor.39 The variety
of state laws that regulate the operations of all institutions, except
those operating under federal charter, is in itself an impediment to
the flow of funds across state lines. Even a federal charter does not
completely eliminate local influence since a mortgage is a state
instrument and the restrictions and limitations prescribed by the
state still apply, whether the loan is made by a local bank on con-
ventional terms, or by the same bank subject to federal mortgage
insurance, or by a national bank, or a federal savings and loan
association. The tendency is to discourage the entry of out-of-state
38Thisinfluence can go far, whether by direct intent or not, toward inducing
lending institutions to support government credit programs. As one mortgage loan
official stated to the author: "We have put our entire portfolio in FHA's because the
examiners never question them.'
Nationalbanks and life insurance companies, not subject to an area restriction
on mortgage loans, have done considerable trading in FHA mortgage paper. Both
the Federal National Mortgage Association and The RFC Mortgage Company have
also contributed to the formationa national market.74 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
funds where redemption periods, deficiency judgment limitations,
and similar restrictions create greater-than-average hazards to the
mortgagee. Pressure to circumvent these impediments and to bring
credit to areas regarded as undersupplied has provided another
impetus for federal intervention.
The local character of real estate finance is in striking contrast
to the national scope of operations in other fields of investment and
has placed realty financing at a relative disadvantage as regards
availability and cost of funds. Broadly speaking, the states have
been unresponsive to demands for more credit; only in the recent
limited authorizations permitting direct investment in realty have
they been moved to provide new investment facilities for real
estate; and here the aim has probably been more to provide finan-
cial institutions with an additional outlet for funds than specifically
to meet the presumed requirements of the real estate market.
Consequently, the pressure for credit expansion to meet express
demands has tended to shift from state legislatures to the federal
Congress. Demands for credit for farmers, urban homeowners, and
owners of urban rental property have created national political
issues; and the federal government has been induced to supple-
ment, through a number of financial devices, funds flowing into
these several uses from the customary sources and to compensate
for the restrictions on the flow of funds resulting from state policies.
One outcome of the federal government's entrance into the
realty credit market has been (through insurance of deposits and
share accounts) to place state-chartered institutions under the in-
fluence and regulation of federal agencies as well as their own
supervisory authorities. Conflict in policy often ensues. The atti-
tude of state authorities may be at variance with the expansionist
policies of the federal agencies. Thus, in 1946 many lenders re-
ported that state supervisors disapproved of 100 percent loans to
veterans. Even in the federal sphere, the conservative attitude of
the supervisory authorities has not always been in complete har-
mony with policies promoted by other agencies.4°
Another angle of governmental concern with credit institutions
40See,for instance, the speech of M. T. Han, Chairman, Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation at Quebec, October 16, 1946 (FDIC release) and the 83rd Annual
Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 1945, p. 2. Both statements decried thin
equities and urged caution in lending at the time when the housing agencies of
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andcredit policies deserves mention: it is the creation of competi-
tive relationships through' the benefits provided, or the limitations
imposed, by law. If state commercial banks can deal in mortgage
lending, then national banks will seek amendments permitting
them to do the same. If federally-chartered institutions may make
high percentage loans, then state institutions are likely to insist
on the same privilege. One group of institutions may not only seek
laws to its own advantage but may also attempt through govern-
mental intervention to prevent competition from other types of
institutions. Thus, competition among the several varieties of lend-
ers is, to some degree, replaced by maneuvering for a legal advan-
tage. Once started, this provides a rich soil for the growth of
governmental intervention.